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Sujoy Sikdar
Algorithmic Decision-Making
Resource Allocation Mechanisms
Voting Systems Analysis
Preference Learning
Computational Social Science
About
Sikdar joined the School of Computing at Binghamton in 2020. He received his PhD and MS in computer science at the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI).
He has broad interests across artificial intelligence, mechanism design, problems at the intersection of computer science and microeconomics, machine learning and computational social science. His research focuses on algorithmic decision-making in the allocation of resources, and voting, with an eye at learning and faithfully representing preferences. He is the recipient of a best paper award at SocialCom2013.
Research Performance Summary
2013-2025
Active Research Span
First Recorded Paper
Understanding information credibility on twitter
Year:
2013
Citations:
77
Venue:
2013 International Conference on Social Computing
Latest Recorded Paper
Bridging Theory and Perception in Fair Division: A Study on Comparative and Fair Share Notions
Year:
2025
Citations:
0
Venue:
arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.10433
Last 10 Years Publication Activity
This timeline shows the professor's yearly publication activity.
Publication Venues and Collaboration
Journal, Conference, and Book Publication Breakdown
Top Coauthors
Sikdar
Xia
Wang
Research Impact by Period
Papers
3
Citations
3
Avg. Citations / Paper
1
H-Index
1
Papers
17
Citations
287
Avg. Citations / Paper
16.9
H-Index
7
Papers
10
Citations
312
Avg. Citations / Paper
31.2
H-Index
6
Papers
3
Citations
140
Avg. Citations / Paper
46.7
H-Index
3
Contact and Professional Links
Detected Research Keywords
Type Resource Allocation
Equitable Allocations Indivisible
Information Credibility Twitter
Mechanism Design Type
Design Type Housing
Type Housing Markets
Resource Allocation Partial
Allocation Partial Preferences
Designing Efficient Fair
Mechanisms Type Resource